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CASTING SUADOWS: TUE BODY IN
DESCARTES, SARTRE, DE BEAUVOIR,
ANDLACAN
A. Beginning
oescartes, dualism is old stuff. Tbe idea that I am a composite of two
radically distinct substances, one whicb is essentially me, tbe soul/mind, aod the
other which is mine but not truly me, tbe body, can barely find a hearing
amoogst contemporary thinkers immersed in tbe continental traditions. We teach
it to our students of course, but only as a reHc of a form of thought now
overcome.
On closer inspection, bowever, we discover that the demise of the dualistic
position is less than complete. Like other dying ideas it has left its legacies.
Tbey appear in most unexpected places. Heirs of Descartes' legacies reject the
two substance thesis, the tbougbt that the human body is a machine and therefore
esseotially other than the mind, as weil as the metbodology of clear and distinct
ideas, the assumption that differences in thought refer to distinctions of kind
which cannot be esseotially related. Unlike Descartes, those thinking wi,thin his
shadow reject the idea that mind and body are tenuously connected in a way that
can oever be elearly understood.
Having eseaped the substance of Descartes' thought, his heirs remain
caught in its shadows. Taking their eue from Descartes, they identify the body
as a source of self alienation and link the alienating powers of the body as a
souree of self alienation and link the alienating powers of the body to its being
a perceivable perceiver, a subject eapable of experiencing itself as an object.
Tbe difference between Deseartes and his Cartesian followers and a thinker
thinking in the shadow of Deseartes' thought is the difference between one who
situates the othemess of the body on the other side of the subject and ODe who
understands the othemess of the body as the othemess of the subject. For the
232
Cartesians the body is the site of an extemal threat to subjectivity. For those
thinking in Descartes' sbadow the body poses a threat from within.
Returning to the source. Fraoce. I use these pages to sketch out the
suggestion that Descartes' legacy lives in the work of Sartret de Beauvoirt and
Lacan. If Wilfrid Desan's Cartesian reading of Sartre is taken into account. tbe
idea that "Bad Faith." "Tbe Look." No Exil and Nausea recall Descartes'
dualism is not unexpected. If we remember the connections between Sartre and
de Beauvoir we should not be surprised to find a Sartrean motif Iiving in a de
Beauvoir analysis. What is significant is the power of the Cartesian legacy and
the difficulty of evading it. Tbe point of this paper. bowever. is not to claim that
we are trapped by our Cartesian legacies. but to explore the ways in whicb we
are learniDg to evade them. Here Lacan is especially provocative. With Lacan
tbe alienating claims of the body to be the subject are expressions of the
subject's desire. Here. the body is the other of the subject not because it is other
than the subjectt but because it is the way the subject brings othemess into itself.
But-and for tbis discussion this is crucial-the body as the other of tbe subject
is not tbe immediately experienced body. but tbe imaged one. Lacan prods us
to pursue the following questions: It is possible to escape the imaged body which
bars us from tbe subject? Is it possible to experience our subjectivity through our
immediate experiences of the body?
B. The Source: Descartes
Tbe pervasive and persistent object of tbe First Meditation's method of
doubt is perception. Tbe belief that perception is a source of knowledge is
undermined by the usual examples of illusions and hallucinations as weil as tbe
unusual dream and evil demon bypotbeses. Tbe language and wax example of
tbe Second Meditation t bowevert reveals that the intent of the First Meditation
is not to dismiss perception per set but only to invalidate the evidence of
existential presence accorded by perception as a bodily activity and to refute the
idea that perception is an exclusive operation of tbe body. Tbe mind is also a
perceiver. Its perceptions are fundamentally different fromthe perceptions of the
body. Tbe mind perceives essences t clear and distinct truths of extended things.
Tbe perceptions of the tbinking thing must not be confused with those of the
extended thing. As an extended thing the body appears to perceive tbe existential
presence of objects. Tbe evidence for this presence. being neitber clear nor
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distinct, is rejected. The particular body I perceive as mine may not exist. Its
claim to be me is doubtful. The Sixth Meditation, under the umbrella of tbe
benevolent God, relents a bit. Yes, the body experienced by perception does
exist. Yes, its claims to be me deserve a hearing. Yes, my extended thing
perceptual experiences are a source of bodily self knowledge insofar as I, as
body, can be the object of pleasure and pain. But no, perception as bodily
activity provides no access to essence; not to the essences of objects other than
myself and not to the essence of myself. Even the benevolent God cannot break
the nde of clear and distinct ideas: the self cannot be both a thinking and
extended substance. The human being may be defined as a composite body and
soul, but the self is the soul/mind.
The Meditations teach us that perception may be understood as both a
mental and a bodily activity. As amental activity it provides access to the
essence of extended substance but provides no evidence for distinguishing
amongst discrete particular bodies of the same type. From the perspective of the
mind, my body is essentially the same as any other human body. As a bodily
activity, however, perception is an experience of bodily presence. From this
perspective, I experience the presence of my body differently than the presence
of other bodies. My body is mine. Other bodies are present to or with me. But
tbis experience is not sufficient to establish my body as Me. If I am to
understand myself, I must break perception's hold on me. 100ugh mine, tbe
body remains an-otber.
Even as it recognizes tbe indubitability of the evidence of presence
provided by perception, the Sixth Meditation cannot aHow tbis presence to
become a self-presence. I cannot clearly understand the evidence of this
presence. I cannot understand myself as a composite body. I can only understand
myself as soul/mind. This leaves an opening, one that Descartes does not (could
not) pursue. There is the possibility that the self could be bodily, though it
would not be able to widerstand itself as such so long as it remained committed
to the principles of Cartesian thought. Sartre, de Beauvoir and Lacan pursue this
opening.
c. The Legacy: Sartre
The suggestion that Sartre is caught in the legacy of Descartes' attack on
the body sounds perverse. Have I forgotten 1he Transcendence ofthe Ego? Isn't
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Sartre clear? There is no transcendental point of reference. I am always and only
an embodied subject. The idea that the self is a soul/mind distinct from the body
is not, however, the whole of Descartes' thesis of the self. There is another
componeot of his theory of subjectivity: the idea that the body is a source of
alienation. Descartes' thesis is not simply that the body is not the self, but more
complexly that the body claims to be the self and that we are lured by this claim
away from ourselves. It is from this more complex claim that the echoes of
Descartes find a place in Sartre's thought.
Like Descartes, Sartre recognizes the unique and intimate relationship
between perception and my experience of myself as body. Because Sartre
recognizes the subject as embodied be cannot take this relationship lightly. He
must undertake an extensive examination of the relationship between subjectivity
and perceptual experience. These examinations take two directions. There is the
direction of "Bad Faith" where it is a question of how I use my perception of
myself as body to escape my freedomJsubjectivity, e.g. the woman in the cafe,
the homosexual. And there is the directioD of "The Look" and No Exil wbere
it is a question of bow, by being an embodied subject available to the
perceptions of the other, I am vulnerable to the loss and exploitation of my
freedomJsubjectivity.
Where for Descartes tbe body alienates me from myself by substituting its
othemess for my essence, for Sartre the body's powers of alienation are
grounded in its being inextricably intertwined with human subjectivity. It is
because the body is not an other that the other encounters me in it. It is because
the body is not an other that I define myself through it. The other is able to use
the availability of my body to rob me of my subjectivity as I am able to use the
determinateness of my body to alienate me from my self not because the body
is not me, but because the body is a mode of my being which I or the other can
use to alienate me from my freedorn.
In both "Bad Faith" and "The Look" the possibility of alienation is the
possibility of objectification. And though the possibilities of objectification are
not determined by or Iimited to the possibility of perceiving and heing perceived,
by perceiving and heing perceivable I find myself drawn into objectifying
practices.
"Bad Faith" describes the ways in which I use the experience of the body
as object and the experience of myself as bodily to negate the tluidity of the
subjectivity of the pour-soL Bad faith describes the lure of the body exposed by
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Descartes. Reading Sartre against the shadow of Descartes we may say that
though Descartes may have been mistaken in severing the body from the subject,
he was not mistaken in warning thatthe perceptions which inscribe us as bodies
have the power to lure os away from ourselves.
"The Look" and No Exil draw on another Cartesian observation. Here it
is not the lure of the perceived and perceivable body that is explored, but the
danger of being perceived and perceivable. Descartes raises this issue as though
it were the question of our access to the other. How, he asks, do we know that
the robot-like objects which we perceive behaving in a mechanical fashion are
human beings? No answer is given, though we are assured that it is a matter of
judgment, and the question is never raised again.
Sartre places Descartes' observation regarding the way in which our
perception of the other as body is a perception of the other as object in a
somewhat different context. Here it is not a question of how we get from the
other as body to the other as subject (for Sartre the body is not the other of the
subject and therefore not something we have to travel through to get to the
subject), but rather a matter of how my being as a perceivable body leaves me
vulnerable to the exploitive, objectifying strategies of the other.
To experience myself as perceived by the other is to experience the power
of the other's subjectivity to deny my OWD. The lived hereness of my body is
transformed into the other's there. There I am, an object in the other's world..
I am still here of course, but my here is no longer mine. It is vulnerable to the
manipulations of the other. Were Sartre a Cartesian he could deny that the body
being exploited isthe subject. But he is not a Cartesian, he is only an heir of
Descartes. Because he is not a Cartesian he cannot separate the exploited body
from the subject. Because he is an heir of Descartes he accepts the idea that the
human body is perceived as an object. Though the Cartesian sequence is
reversed, the effect is the same. Descartes describes human bodies that appear
to be objects and wonders how we ever discover that they are subjects. Sartre
experiences the subjectivity of the other as the power of reducing himlher to a
body object within an alien perceptual fjeld. Wherever we begin, we arrive at
the same place. Perception draws the human figure into the category, object.
In both the theme of the lure of the body in "Bad Faith, " and the analysis
of the danger of the body in "The Look" and No Exil, we discover that the
Cartesian attitude toward the body is preserved. No longer disjoined from the
subject, the body remains a source of alienation. The setting of No Exil shows
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tbis as elearly as any of Sartre's words. Here in the room that is both Hell and
the site of possible salvation there are no mirrors. Embodied subjects are barred
from seeing themselves. This route to bad faith is barred. Other routes abound.
As embodied subjects, eaeh eharaeter remains available to the eyes of the other,
and tbis availability is exploited. But the hope of No Exil seems to be that if
eaeh ean forgo perceiving the other as object and if each can refuse to aeeept the
bad faith requests of the others, the absence of mirrors will make it possible for
eaeh to escape the alienations of the body.
Sartre uses the mirror in Nausea, however, somewhat differently. Here it
becomes a site of liberation. Roquentin discovers that absenting himself from the
social fabrie of Bouville makes it impossible for him to recognize bis face in the
mirror. It' is transformed from a stable object into a fluid successiOD of images.
Here the mirror offers the possibility of a different sort of perception-an
unmediated experience of the body. Tbe suggestion that the body as perceived
in the everyday world is other than the experienced body is pursued throughout
Nausea. The hand becomes a erab elaw. The body becomes elastie. Its
appearanee as a stable self-defined object is not the effect of a natural process,
not a reflection of the immediately given, but an effect of a social eonstruetion.
The body is made into an object. It is not immediately experieneed as one.
The sense of these early works then is that though the body is not my
other, because it is the me immediately available to/for the other, and because
it is the me most amenable to the strategies of "Bad Faith, " it ean become, and
more often than not does become, the site of othemess. We are subjects subject
to the lure and danger of the body. Though caught by the shadow of Descartes'
thought of the body as pereeived, pereeivable, perceiving and alienating, this
thinking also points to a thinking that eould distanee itself from Descartes. In
this thinking the body as immediately experieneed would be a mode of being
whieh affirms ratherthan alienates Iived subjectivity.
D. The Legacy: de Beauvoir
In 1he Second Sex Simone de Beauvoir takes up the themes of subjectivity
and the body with specifie attention to the issue of woman. In moving from the
abstractions of philosophy and the imaginings of literature to the historical
eonerete situation of woman de Beauvoir's ease against the body is at once more
eomplex and more ambiguous than Sartre's. Sartre's undeveloped thought that
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the body-object is a socially constructed reality rather than an immediately
experienced one is carefully pursued. It is not woman's immediately experienced
body that closes her off from subjectivity, but the ways in which her perceived
body has been given the meaning of the other and the ways in which she
complies with this meaning that reduce her experienced body to a perceived
object available for exploitation. Here the force of Descartes' legacy loses some
but not all of its power. The link between the body and its status as a pre-given,
pereeptual object is weakened. The link between the body and the alienation of
the subject, however, remains.
The Second Sex pursues two questions: How did it happen that in the
struggle for subjectivity one sex, the male, came to permanently occupy the
position of the subject, while the other sex, the female, came to permanently
occupy the position of the other, the object? How did it happen that aetivities of
transcendenee, activities that allow os to escape the lure of the body, were made
available to and demanded of the man and refused the woman? The second
question directly addresses the issue of Descartes' legaey.
Oe Beauvoir begins by defining subjectivity as transeendence. She then ties
transeendenee to a specific relationship to the body, risk. Briefly, for de
Beauvoir subjectivity is an aehievement of an adult human being. The
achievement is an affirmation of transcendence. To be human is to refuse to
accept the world as given. Whether the author of the meaning of the world is
seen as God, Nature, Political Authorities or Parents, the authority of the other
to define and situate me within the world must be rejected if I am to occupy the
plaee of the subject, the one who exists as the freedom of self-definition.
Because I am a human subject, an embodied subject, my affirmation of
subjectivity must engage the body. Whether she is describing nomadic and
agricultural eommunities or the situation of the contemporary adolescent, de
Beauvoir insists that the ehallenge to authority that establishes the subject must
be bodily. My body exp'resses my subjectivity when I risk it, Le., when it aets
in ways that reveal it is not determined by the laws of survival or mechanies.
In risking my body I ehallenge its appearanee as perceived object. Thus de
Beauvoir speaks of warrior aets as humanizing, of the violence of male
adolescents as humanizing, of risk taking as humanizing, and of freely allowing
oneself to become vulnerable as humanizing. In eaeh of these aets, the pereeived
body lives in ways that elude objectification.
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Tbe sbadow of tbe Cartesian body takes a twist. De Beauvoir rejecls the
idea that biology is destiny. One is not bom, one becomes, a woman. To be
perceived as a female body is not to be perceived as a woman. ODe becomes a
woman. And one may become a woman eitber as an embodied female who
authors ber subjectivity or as an embodied female who is an object for man's
subjectivity. Becoming a subject always requires bodily risk. Within tbe current
structure of patriarcby it also requires violence.
Tbe theme of "The Look," that the body is the site of intersubjective
violence, is brougbt to bear on tbe issue of patriarchy. The weakness and
childbearing nature of the woman's body somehow makes it vulnerable to
structura~ objectification. The woman becomes the body that is acted upon and
tbat submits to what bappens to it (e.8., childbearing). The man becomes the
active body, the subject. De Beauvoir does not reject the patriarchal link
between bodily risk, self-affirmation and violence. Her argument is witb the
ways in wbich the structures of patriarchyengage men but bar women from
violent, risk-taking, self-affirmative, transcendent activities.
Again we begin to elude Descartes' shadow. The body is now morethan
a source of alienation; it is also a site of self affirmation. Because the body is
me, it is through tbe body that I become me. With de Beauvoir, the alienating
dimensions of the body are historical not ontologicaI. This is not to suggest that
they are not powerful but rather represenls a re-alignment of the relationship
between "Bad Faith" and "The Look." Where the analyses of Being atul
NOlhingness seem to give priority to the alienating powers of "Bad Faith" or at
least give "Bad Faith" and "The Look" equal status, The Second Sex suggests
that tbe alienations of "The Look" fuel the lures of "Bad Faith. "
De Beauvoir's analyses do not reject the Cartesian thought of the body as
alienating. They do, however t point to a way of understanding the body as other
than alienating. They suggest that though the body is/can be tbe alienation of
subjectivity, the alienations of subjectivity are not attributable to its embodiment.
Within the structures of patriarchy the escape from the Cartesian legacy is a
route of violence reserved for men. Without rejecting the liberating power of
violence, de Beauvoir suggests two alternatives to the patriarchal route toward
subjectivity. The first route is the way of transcendence through conquest,
risking the body in tbe world. The second is the way through vulnerability t
risking the body in erotic love. Unlike the violent route of patriarchy, neither
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of these routes validates the objectification of the other or favors the stronger
body.
We bave gone from the body as olber, to the body as alienating othemess,
to tbe body as the site of self-affirmative transcendence through risk, violence,
conquest and vulnerabiIity. But we have yet to fully leave the shadow of
Descartest body: the thought of the body as dangerous. In all of tbis the body
remains a lure and a risk. Even when its link to subjectivity is affirmative, its
power to affirm the subject is linked to its power to destroy it.
E. The Legacy: Lacan
Lacan accepts the idea that the perceived body experienced as mine is not
me. By exploring the dynamic by whicb tbe otber of the perceived body is taken
to be the subject, however, be discovers that it is not the objectness of the body
that alienates subjectivity, but tbe desire of the subject speaking through the
body that closes the subject off from itself. Or at least, this is what I take to be
the implication of his discussion of the "Mirror Stage. "
The account of the mirror stage is by now quite familiare Tbe human
infant encounters its reflection in the mirror and becomes captivated by it.
Unlike other animals who recognize tbat tbeir reflected image is an empty
double, tbe human infant plays with its reflected image, is faseinated by it and
ultimately identifies with it. Where the animal remains rooted in the experieneed
body, the infant adopts the imaged body.
Lacan accounts for tbe infantts preference for the reflected image in the
following way. In seeing itself in the mirrort the infant sees itself as it is seen
by the other. This seeing is erotic, not epistemological. It is laden with desire.
The other who sees it is not a neutralobserver but a desiring other whose desire
it (the infant) wishes to be. In desiring to be the image of itself desired by the
other, and in identifying'with its imaged body as desired by the other, the infant
brings otbemess into itself; for it is as otber (the other of its bodily experience)
that the image elicits the infanCs desire, and it is for the other that the infant
embraces its imaged othemess.
Repression finds its earliest expression here. The infant could not effect
this mis-recognized identification without repressing its bodily experience. It
could not be the desired of the other if it recognized the discontinuity between
its experienced and imaged body. The desire of the desire to be the desired of
the other asserts itself by repressing tbe diseontinuity. As the imaged body takes
240
the place of the experienced body, tbe ego, modeled on the body image, is
formed and (OOs) identified as tbe subject.
The legacy remains. The body is OOstaken for the subject. Perception plays
a crucial role. But tbe body now casts a double shadow. As the perceived and
perceivable it is not immediately given to us as one mechanical object among
others but becomes objectified through the dialectic of desire. As the subject is
the other of the ego, the experienced body is the other of the perceived one.
And as we look more closely we are tempted to say that insofar as it is not the
body which bars us from the subject but the perceived/imaged body which
alienates us from ourselves, it is through areturn to the experienced body that
an attunement with/to subjectivity becQmes possible; f~r Lacan's descriptions of
the experienced body as discontinuous, fractured, and fragmented are as close
as anything we might imagine to his depiction of the subject as an absence which
escapes all fixations of desire.
As with Sartre and de Beauvoir, the body becomes the double site of the
subject. It is that which fixes it the subject, thus alienating it from itself; and
that which transcends the fixities invites. For Lacan, as for de Beauvoir, it is by
risking the body as the embodiment of itself that the subject can engage in the
project of self-recovery. The setting of No Exil now seems to say it alle It is not
the body but the desire expressed in the image of the body that is the other of
the subject. If we could renounce the appeal of the image and undo the priority
of sight, if the world were without mirrors, and if the other refused to reflect
us, the body would not be the alienation of the subject.
Lacan twists the legacy of Descartes almost beyond recognition. The body
is still perceivable as an object and it stilliuresthe subject away from itself. Its
objective structure is not, however, a sign of its othemess but rather a mark of
its complicity with the subject's desire. It is because the body is the subject that
it can misrepresent the subject and get its forgery accepted as legitimate
currency.
In insisting on the embodiment of the subject Lacan does more than close
the gap between body and self. He transforrns the meanings of the body. It
remains of course the perceivable mode of the subject. The idea that it is
perceived as one type of object amongst others, however, is rejected. The body
with which I mistakenly identify is the imago of my desire. More dramatically,
it comes to be at the insistence of desire. According to Lacan, the body which
I take as mine is not rooted in my bodily experience but is a construct imposed
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on experience. The perceived completed, coordinated body is substituted for the
experienced unbounded, vital, excessive body because the one but not the other
presents itsel f as the desire of the other.
F. Is There a Happy Ending?
Whether the body is that aspect of me that is perceived or whether the
body is that perceptual object which illicitly claims to be me is the question
given to us by Descartes. Descartes' answer is clear. The body's claims to be
me are illegitimate. I am a thinking, not an extended thing. His answer has been
repudiated. His suspicions regarding the body have not.
These pages have sketched the ways in which questions of perception and
questions of the body/self were joined by Descartes and remain related today.
They have suggested that the way to escape the influence of Descartes' legacy
is to distinguish amongst the various modes of perception and to identify which
if any of these modes might be appealed to suggest that the body is not
necessarily an alienation of the self.
Within the Meditations Descartes identifies three forms of perceptual
experience. There are the mental perception of essence, the body perception of
concrete objects, and the body experience of existential presence. Descartes
questioned the relationship between mental and body perceptions and found that
they were distinct. The essence of an extended substance is not encountered in
our bodily experience of it. In assuming that the body perception of concrete
objects was simultaneously an experience of existential presence Descartes
assumed that the body perception of the human figure as object and as presence
was identical. His heirs have questioned this assumption.
Remaining w-ithin the shadow of Descartes' thought, but refusing to accept
the radical otherness of self and body, Descartes' heirs have explored the
alienating dimensions o( the body in an effort to understandthe phenomenon of
self-alienation. It is, I think, because they understand the self as embodied that
they have come to distinguish the human figure experienced as presence from
the human body perceived as object. What seems to have emerged from the
thought of Sartre, de Beauvoir, and Lacan is the idea that the experienced
presence of the human figure is an immediate experience of subjectivity which
is covered over by an objectifying perception. Thus the body is the other of the
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self only insofar as our experience of its objectivity is accepted in place of, or
is allowed to repress, our experience of its existential presence.
We are left to ponder the implications of these observations. At least one
seems clear. Descartes' dualism is not refuted by simply affinning the
embodiment of the subject. To escape the influences of the dualism we must
pursue the thought that the perception which gives us the body-object is the
work of desire and not arefleetion of immediate experience. For Sartre and de
Beauvoir tbe body becomes the site of self-alienation because it isthe
perceived/perceivable subjeet. They note, however, that as the
perceived/perceivable, the body can also become the site of self-expression. It
can embody the self-transcending activities that constitute subjectivity. This idea
is pushed to its limit by Lacan. Strategies of desire . infect perception. To
uncover these strategies is to discover the experienced body, the body prior to
its being laken up witbin the dialectic of desire. This body is the clue to, rather
than the alienation of, the subjeet. By distinguishing the experienced from the
perceived-imaged body tbis clue directs us to explore non-imaged ways of
attending to the body. It challenges us to develop a language that could describe
tbis un-mediated body experience. It also suggests that the cohesiveness of the
subjeet is radically other than the unity of the objeet, and thatthe embodied
subjeet is only experienced as an objeet when this othemess is refused.
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